Proof Step: c_0_39

name: c_0_39 syntax: thf role: plain inference: evalgc

Proof State Overview

proof_step c_0_0 ⊕ keysFor = ? c_0_35 c_0_35 c_0_0->c_0_35 c_0_1 ⊕ image_nat_nat X327 bot_bot_set_nat = bot_bot_set_nat c_0_1->c_0_35 c_0_2 ⊖ member_nat X3 bot_bot_set_nat c_0_36 ⊖ bot_bot_nat_o X3 c_0_2->c_0_36 c_0_3 ⊕ bot_bot_set_nat = collect_nat bot_bot_nat_o c_0_3->c_0_35 c_0_4 ⊕ bot_bot_nat_o = ? c_0_4->c_0_36 c_0_39 ⊕ member_msg crypt esk255_1 X4 esk256_1 X4 X4 ⊕ keysFor X4 = bot_bot_set_nat c_0_35->c_0_39 c_0_36->c_0_39 c_0_41 ⊕ $false c_0_39->c_0_41

Input Dependencies

c_0_0 c_0_1 c_0_2 c_0_3 c_0_4

Assumptions

c_0_35 c_0_36

Conclusion

c_0_39

Dependents

c_0_41

Formula

! [X4: set_msg] :
  ( ( member_msg @ ( crypt @ ( esk255_1 @ X4 ) @ ( esk256_1 @ X4 ) ) @ X4 )
  | ( ( keysFor @ X4 )
    = bot_bot_set_nat ) )

Source

inference(evalgc,[status(thm)],[inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(dynamic_cnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_35]),c_0_36])])