Proof Step: c_0_35

name: c_0_35 syntax: thf role: plain inference: evalgc

Proof State Overview

proof_step c_0_0 ⊕ keysFor = ? c_0_30 ⊕ keysFor X4 = bot_bot_set_nat ⊖ ? = bot_bot_nat_o c_0_0->c_0_30 c_0_1 ⊕ image_nat_nat X327 bot_bot_set_nat = bot_bot_set_nat c_0_1->c_0_30 c_0_3 ⊕ bot_bot_set_nat = collect_nat bot_bot_nat_o c_0_3->c_0_30 c_0_35 c_0_35 c_0_30->c_0_35 c_0_39 ⊕ member_msg crypt esk255_1 X4 esk256_1 X4 X4 ⊕ keysFor X4 = bot_bot_set_nat c_0_35->c_0_39

Input Dependencies

c_0_0 c_0_1 c_0_3

Assumptions

c_0_30

Conclusion

c_0_35

Dependents

c_0_39

Formula

! [X4: set_msg] :
  ( ( ( keysFor @ X4 )
    = bot_bot_set_nat )
  | ( ? [X4849: msg] : ( member_msg @ ( crypt @ ( esk255_1 @ X4 ) @ X4849 ) @ X4 )
  <~> ( bot_bot_nat_o @ ( esk255_1 @ X4 ) ) ) )

Source

inference(evalgc,[status(thm)],[inference(neg_ext,[status(thm)],[c_0_30])])