Proof Step: c_0_36

name: c_0_36 syntax: thf role: plain inference: evalgc

Proof State Overview

proof_step c_0_2 ⊖ member_nat X3 bot_bot_set_nat c_0_32 ⊖ member_nat X3 bot_bot_set_nat c_0_2->c_0_32 c_0_4 ⊕ bot_bot_nat_o = ? c_0_31 ⊕ member_nat X3 bot_bot_set_nat ⊖ bot_bot_nat_o X3 c_0_4->c_0_31 c_0_36 ⊖ bot_bot_nat_o X3 c_0_31->c_0_36 c_0_32->c_0_36 c_0_39 ⊕ member_msg crypt esk255_1 X4 esk256_1 X4 X4 ⊕ keysFor X4 = bot_bot_set_nat c_0_36->c_0_39

Input Dependencies

c_0_2 c_0_4

Assumptions

c_0_31 c_0_32

Conclusion

c_0_36

Dependents

c_0_39

Formula

! [X3: nat] :
  ~ ( bot_bot_nat_o @ X3 )

Source

inference(evalgc,[status(thm)],[inference(sr,[status(thm)],[c_0_31,c_0_32])])